Chapter 6A.2 PC UK

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  [email protected].  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

As I write, detailed reviews of the incident are under way.  But the basic facts are not in dispute, and they raise serious questions about our air security strategy.

Abdulmutallab began his journey in Ghana, flying first to Lagos and then to Amsterdam before transferring to flight 253.  He had 80 grams (about three ounces) of plastic explosive sewn into his underwear and carried a syringe full of acid to use as a detonator.  He passed through airport screening three times, attracting no special attention at any of the airports. 

Abdulmutallab had only carry-on luggage for a purported two-week trip, and he’d paid cash for his round-trip ticket.  None of that was deeply suspicious by itself.  Cash purchases aren’t as rare in Africa as they are in Europe or North America.  And for anyone who’s waited – and waited -- for luggage at the end of a long flight, a traveler who can carry on all the luggage he needs for a two-week stay is cause more for envy than for suspicion. 

But there was plenty of reason to be suspicious of Abdulmutallab, and the information was already in the hands of the US and UK governments.

Umar Abdulmutallab began his journey to Islamic terrorism where so many did.  In Europe.  While attending University College London, Abdulmutallab established communications with several dangerous Islamic radicals who were under surveillance by MI5, the UK domestic intelligence service.  But MI5 evidently lacked the evidence and manpower to follow up.  In the absence of a reason to believe that Abdulmutallab was an immediate threat, MI5 never put him under surveillance.  Worse yet, MI5 decided that privacy and politics required the agency to withhold information about Abdulmutallab from American agencies.  As one British official told the Sunday Times, “You can imagine the public fuss if they passed the Americans everything they had on all those who simply hold radical views.” 

Indeed you can.  This attitude permeated European thinking.  It was the reason we had revised the VWP program to insist on greater information sharing about suspected terrorists from our counterparts in Europe.  Unfortunately, even the British, with whom we had a relatively close counterterrorism relationship, had not agreed to a broad sharing of information about Islamic radicals – even foreign radicals – operating within their borders.  In 2008, lacking any information from the British that might have spurred a deeper inquiry on terrorism grounds, the US embassy in London issued a two-year visa to the young man, whose wealthy father guaranteed that he would pose little immigration risk.

Comments

[anglo]

So it's the Brits' or more generally the Europeans' fault? Your own President said your systems didn't work. The US had various "dots" including from European sources, which it failed to join up. Stop blaming others for your own failings.

[sbaker]

Well, I didn't say it was *all* the Europeans' fault. I'm hard on the US government failings as well. There's plenty of blame to go around. But it's a copout to say "Your system wasn't perfect, so we had no obligation to help." I'm sure there were plenty of mistakes on the way to Dunkirk, but that wasn't a reason for us to stay on the other side of the Atlantic.