Skating on Stilts

Second Guessers Second Guessed by Reality

Earlier this month the Washington Post reported that TSA had caved in to industry objections and scaled back its plan to regulate the use of General Aviation aircraft (that is, small private airplanes).  The crucial part of that determination was a May 2009 report by the DHS Inspector General which called the security threat from small planes, "limited and mostly hypothetical."  I don't think that Joseph Stack got the message and I'm sure that the IRS employees in Austin are taking comfort in the hypothetical nature of the attack on them yesterday.

All too often our security responses are condemned as "too reactive."  We are always protecting against the last attack and never looking forward enough.  The IG report is an almost tragic example of the opposite trend -- when someone makes the effort to think constructively and proactively about as-yet-unrealized threats they are accused of fear mongering and engaging in "hypotheticals."  Well, the hypothetical became reality yesterday.

One only hopes it is enough to shame the general aviation industry into forgoing its opposition to helpful security measures and to embolden TSA to do the right thing.

Don't Change the Channel! We left Fox News out of the Privacy Assessment!

With his usual nudge-and-wink, Matt Drudge invites us to be dismayed that "BIG SIS" -- his moniker for Janet Napolitano -- is "Monitoring Web Sites for Terror and Disaster Info." Drudge links to a story saying that DHS will be monitoring social media like Twitter, as well as websites like Drudge, to keep abreast of events during the Winter Olympics. The source of the story is a twelve-page "Privacy Impact Assessment" issued by DHS.

This isn’t the first Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on DHS's use of social media. A few weeks earlier, DHS wrote a similar assessment of using social media during Haitian rescue operations.

I am indeed dismayed, but not for Drudge's reasons. True, it's disappointing that neither the Volokh Conspiracy nor www.skatingonstilts.com is deemed worthy of government monitoring. But what’s really dismaying is that DHS and its Privacy Office felt obliged to labor over two separate and painfully obvious privacy assessments just to do things that you and I would do by simply firing up our browsers.

The Olympics PIA says in the first paragraph that DHS “is only monitoring publicly available online forums, blogs, public websites, and message boards.” Which should pretty much end the discussion.

The government ought to be able to read the papers or watch TV or look at blogs just like anyone else. Or so you’d think. But no, the PIA drones on and on, offering thirty variations of “Hey, this stuff is public” as it assesses the “privacy impact” of, uh, surfing the web.

And so we get painfully obvious applications of irrelevant privacy principle like this:

“7.1 What are the procedures that allow individuals to gain access to their information?

Social media are public websites. All users have access to their information through their user accounts. Individuals should consult the privacy policies of the services they subscribe to for more information.”

Did we really need the federal government to tell us that?

The biggest problem with this policy, though, isn't the "well, duh" response it inspires. DHS apparently went into a defensive crouch about the whole program. The PIA is full of unnecessary and risky effort to appease privacy zealots.

First, the PIAs expire quickly (the Olympics PIA expires after thirty days, Haiti after ninety), which suggests that DHS is planning on issuing a new PIA every time it wants to look at social media for a new event or disaster. The problem with that policy isn’t just that the waste of time and electrons. The policy is also likely to slow the use of social media in the first hours of an event, when they’d be most useful. For example, the PIA for Haiti social media monitoring was issued on January 21 – nine days after the earthquake struck. Tweets from the rubble were probably getting a little stale by then (though we can hope that DHS did the monitoring first and the PIA later).

Worse, DHS says it won’t collect or share any personally identifiable data (PII), even if the information is included in the tweets. It reassures us that “any PII related to the posting will be redacted.” Does that mean that a tweet saying, “Henri Rideau is buried alive under the rubble at his home, 124 Rue Cayenne” will only be distributed after someone takes the time to bowdlerize it to read, “--- is buried alive under the rubble at ---”?

I’m sure Henri will thank DHS for protecting his personally identifiable information.

If someone else digs him out.

The PIA also assures us that DHS won’t read posts on sites that require a user name and login. This is also a wildly overbroad "protection" for privacy. It applies even if the site is entirely open to the public, apparently, since Facebook is not listed. In fact, the last time I looked, the Washington Post required a login, too, and it too is left off the list. But maybe DHS can wait for the dead tree edition before it gets any disaster news broken by the Post.

Is there really a difference between public posts and Facebook updates that are shared with everyone on Facebook? If your mobile phone is set to send messages as Facebook updates rather than tweets, the government will never know you’re in trouble, thanks to this incoherent effort to appease the privacists.

DHS deserves some credit for actually understanding the value of social media in a crisis, but its self-inflicted limitations will either prevent imaginative use of social media or will guarantee violations when these unnecessary limits are set aside as a sensible response to some breaking crisis.

And that will predictably lead to new Drudge headlines: “Developing ... BIG SIS violated privacy rules hundreds of times in ‘emergency’ monitoring of Americans ...”

In the long run, I guess, dumb privacy policy is its own punishment.

Chapter 6A.9 Game and Match

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

That brings us back to Christmas Day 2009, and the question of why Abdulmutallab wasn’t on a no-fly or selectee list, or for that matter why 95% of the terrorist suspects known to the US government are treated like upstanding citizens when they get to the TSA checkpoint. 

Imagine for a minute that you were a security official watching the ACLU press conference in 2008.  You see that the organization got the number of names on the list wrong, trashed TSA for a problem they’d created themselves, and received fawning coverage for it.  Do you really want to stick your head over the parapet and suggest a substantial expansion of lists that the ACLU says are already “out of control” and are victimizing tens of millions of Americans?  Nope, in those circumstances, there wasn’t much chance that standards for getting on the lists would be eased, or that TSA would soon get operational access to the other 95% of the database. 

In the end, when all is said and done, the investigations of the incident will find errors in how the agencies handled the lists and the screening.  But when they do, for once we should skip the football analogies. 

The errors weren’t “fumbles” or “dropped balls.”  Instead, the most apt analogy comes from tennis.

Because if ever there were a “forced error” in policymaking, this is it. 

And as in tennis, full credit should go to the privacy advocates that forced it.

Chapter 6A.8 Chutzpah

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

Remarkably, that wasn’t all.  The episode turned out to be far worse for security and far better for the privacy campaigners than even they could have hoped.  Because as long as Secure Flight was stalled, we were all stuck with the old system of sending lists to airlines and living with whatever their creaking computer systems dished up.  Most of the airlines couldn’t tell Sen. Stevens’s wife, Catherine, from the singer formerly known as Cat Stevens, a reported apologist for the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.  

As the lists grew, and Secure Flight languished, you might have thought that the privacy groups and the airlines would start to take some heat.  After all, their opposition was the reason that so many people were being hassled for no good reason.  But they didn’t feel any heat at all.  Quite the reverse.  In an unexpected bonus, the blame fell entirely on the agency that had tried to fix the problem years earlier. 

It must have been deeply satisfying.  The privacy machine had created a vicious cycle.  As long as Secure Flight was stalled, administering even a small no-fly and selectee list was painfully difficult -- and a massive inconvenience for travelers whose names resembled those on the no-fly and selectee lists.  Even better, TSA took all the blame, thus discrediting both the idea of screening for possible terrorists and an agency that no traveler was much disposed to love in any event.  Every time TSA’s reputation took a hit for mismatched names, it became easier for Congress and the privacy groups to argue that the agency couldn’t be entrusted to administer a new program. 

Better still, from the privacy groups’ perspective, the millions of privacy victims created by the mismatched names became an excuse for rolling back other security measures, including the terrorist watchlist.  In 2008, when TSA began to get close to meeting the Congressional requirements for Secure Flight, Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU held a news conference to announce that the watchlist had reached one million names (he was wrong, but the coverage was good anyway).  “The list is out of control,” he said.  “There cannot possibly be one million terrorists threatening and poised to attack us. If there were, our cities would be in ruins.” 

And with a chutzpah rarely equalled in American policy circles, Steinhardt mourned “the tens of millions of Americans [who would now be] caught up in a Kafkaesque web of suspicion." 

He should know. 

He had spun the web those Americans had been trapped in. 

Chapter 6A.7 Gunning for CAPPS

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

“This system threatens to create a permanent blacklisted underclass of Americans who cannot travel freely,” an ACLU counsel told USA Today in February 2003.  Another declared that CAPPS II would “give the government an opening to create the kind of Big Brother program that Americans rejected so resoundingly in the Pentagon,” a swipe at Adm. Poindexter.

By June 2003 the organization had filed suit to block the program.  By August a left-right privacy coalition was lobbying against it.  And by September, just two years after 9/11, the privacy groups had won.  Congressional appropriators stopped the program dead in its tracks, prohibiting implementation of any such program until the General Accountability Office certified that ten strict conditions had been met. 

DHS spent the next five years trying to meet those requirements.  Finally, in late 2008, DHS announced that it was launching Secure Flight, a pale imitation of the original program that gave TSA access to no traveler information other than name, gender, and birthdate. 

Even then, GAO demonstrated that it had learned the facts of life in Washington – you can’t go wrong overestimating the clout of the privacy machine.  Knowing that it would never be criticized for refusing to certify compliance, GAO declared that TSA had met only nine out of ten requirements and let the appropriators deem that sufficient to begin Secure Flight.  To its credit, the Obama Administration did not treat that as an excuse to delay the program; it continued to roll out Secure Flight in 2009.

But if you’ve wondered why, eight years after 9/11, we’re still looking for weapons and not for terrorists, now you know.  Privacy advocates turned the use of even ordinary data like travel reservations into the policy equivalent of a toxic waste site.  No one wanted to go anywhere near it, and those who did rarely survived the experience. 

Chapter 6A.6 CAPPS II

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

DHS was brand-new in 2003.  One of its priorities was to do exactly what the talking heads have been demanding in the wake of the Christmas Day attack.  It wanted to transform TSA’s screening system from one that looked mainly for weapons to one that looked for terrorists as well.  The tool for doing that would be a second generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, or CAPPS II.  CAPPS II would process passengers’ travel reservations to identify possible terror suspects much earlier and screen them more carefully -- both before they got to the checkpoint and while they were there. 

Until 2003, because it lacked access to travel reservation data, TSA had relied on the airlines to do the screening.  It sent over a list of names, and the airlines checked to see if anyone with that name had made a reservation.  If the person was on the no-fly list, the airline refused to give him a boarding pass.  If he was on a selectee list, his boarding pass was marked so that screeners could single him out for additional screening. 

That system was deeply unsatisfactory for many reasons, particularly as information sharing took hold, and a consolidated list of terrorism suspects was assembled from the many separate databases that existed before 9/11.  Once these names had been assembled, the list was long and sensitive.  No one wanted to trust unknown airline personnel with the crown jewels of US counterterrorism intelligence, so giving them the entire list was out of the question. 

Plus, the airlines weren’t that good a figuring out when they had a name that matched.  They’d flag Abdulmutallab for screening if that was the name they received from the government.  But not Abdul Mutallab.  Or Abdulmuttallab.  If even the US government can’t manage to match a misspelled Abdulmutallab to the real thing, it’s asking too much to expect the airlines to do better.  So, to make sure that planes were not brought down by a typo, the government tried to supply all the likely variants and misspellings and aliases for every suspect’s name. 

But that created a new problem.  Millions of Americans have names that resemble those on the list.  Of course they have different addresses and birthdates, so a halfway decent computer system would not flag those people for scrutiny.  The problem was that the many in the perennially bankrupt airline industry didn’t have a halfway decent computer system, and they weren’t eager to spend money upgrading their systems just to do the government’s screening job for it. 

So in 2003, DHS proposed to take over the processing of the list.  The idea was straightforward.  TSA would collect reservation data from the airlines and run its terror suspect lists against the reservations.  The reservation data would help resolve ambiguities where two people had similar names.  It would also provide new security capabilities, allowing TSA to identify connections between suspects that were on its list and previously unknown passengers who shared addresses or phone numbers with the suspects and who might be conspiring with them. 

In short, it would create the one tool that could have stopped the attacks of 9/11.  It would give security officials quick and easy access to domestic travel reservations.  If they’d had that in August of 2001, officials could have first located the two known al Qaeda operatives and then spotted most of the others through links in their reservation information.

With that background, the new system must have seemed like a no-brainer to the leadership of DHS.  But, fresh from their victories over TIPS and TIA, the privacy coalition had other ideas. 

Chapter 6A.5 Myth and Reality

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

In fact, nothing illustrates the clout of the left-right privacy machine than a second failing demonstrated on Christmas Day 2009.  That is TSA’s inability to use screening information that is routinely used by all the other security agencies in government.

The US has pretty good information on four hundred thousand terrorism suspects, but fewer than twenty thousand of them are on the lists that TSA uses to screen air travelers.  That means that 95% of the identified terrorist suspects can get on a plane bound for the US without receiving any more scrutiny than a grandmother from Dubuque. 

CBP knows about these 400 thousand suspects.  The FBI and CIA know about them.  So does the State Department.  But not TSA.  For TSA, if you aren’t on the no-fly or selectee lists, you’re just regular folks. 

Why?  Because that’s the way the privacy campaigners want it.  It’s the intended result of their remarkably successful effort first to stall and then to roll back the security reforms undertaken after 9/11.

There’s a well-establish civil libertarian mythology about the nation’s response to 9/11.  In the myth, a frightened US government throws civil liberties out the window within weeks of the attacks, launching a seven-year attack on our privacy that a new administration is only now slowly (too slowly, say the advocates) beginning to moderate. 

In real life, privacy groups mobilized within weeks of 9/11, and they won victory after victory, right from the start.  First, within a month of the attacks, they forced the Justice Department to negotiate the USA PATRIOT Act line by line with Chairman Leahy of the Judiciary committee – a process often ignored when the act is presented as fait accompli imposed on a panicky Congress by the Executive Branch. 

Then within eighteen months of the attacks, the privacy campaigners killed the TIPS program, designed to encourage citizens to report suspicious behavior, as well as Adm. Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness program. 

After that, they went looking for bigger game.  What they found was TSA, a gift that would keep on giving for half a decade.

Chapter 6A.4 Rise of the Machine

This is another excerpt from my book on technology, terrorism, and DHS, tentatively titled "Skating on Stilts."  (If you want to read the excerpts in a more coherent fashion, try the categories on the right labeled "Excerpts from the book." I'm afraid I can't fix the bug in TypePad that prevents me from putting them in the category in reverse-chronological order, but I have started putting chapters up in pdf form from time to time.)  Comments and factual quibbles are welcome, either in the comments section or by email:  fact.check.baker@gmail.com.  If you're dying to order the book, send mail to the same address.   

--Stewart Baker

But a system that only works after a transatlantic flight has landed doesn’t do much good if al Qaeda is trying to blow up the plane before it lands.  Protecting the flight, as opposed to the border, is supposed to be TSA’s job.  If CBP can construct a workable screening system that uses all of the government’s data, why didn’t TSA have such a system eight years after 9/11?

The short answer is that TSA tried to build such a system and was rebuffed by a well-organized privacy campaign.  In fact, during the years since 9/11, privacy lobbyists managed to stall a host of new air security measures.  In particular, they forced TSA to postpone and largely neuter the kind of data-based screening system that has worked so well at the border.

          They had help from history.  Keeping weapons off planes was our central strategy for years – since the days of the Cuban hijackings in the 1960s.  But it was obvious for years that that strategy was played out.  Weapons kept getting smaller and their hiding places kept getting more imaginative and harder, or more embarrassing, to find.  (The 80 grams of explosive that Abdulmutallab was carrying weighed a bit more than a hot dog, and a bit less than bra inserts that can change a B cup to a C.)

The focus on weapons had to change, about which more later, but at present searching for weapons is the system we have, and it needs improvement badly.  As everyone now knows, we actually do have better ways to find small weapons hidden in embarrassing places.  The millimeter-wave and backscatter machines that look beneath clothing are far preferable to a “patdown” that probes everywhere that three ounces of explosives could be hidden.  And, creepy as the scanners are, the privacy issues can be handled by making sure the images can’t be stored or copied and the image screeners are nowhere near the people being screened.

TSA had been using these machines as an alternative to patdowns in “secondary” screening for about a year.  But most travelers don’t trigger secondary scrutiny.  Abdulmutallab didn’t.  If keeping weapons off the plane is our main line of defense – and it is – we need to screen everyone for the weapons Abdulmutallab was carrying.

So why don’t we?  After the attack, everyone was clamoring for the scanners, and the privacy groups seemed quite responsible on the subject.  As Marc Rotenberg, head of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, told the New York Times last week, “his group had not objected to the use of the devices, as long as they were designed not to store and record images.” 

For an organization committed to staving off 1984, EPIC seems remarkably adept at dropping things down the memory hole.  Just three months before claiming that it didn’t want to prohibit whole body imaging, EPIC and nearly two dozen other privacy groups sent a letter to Congress saying that whole body imaging ought to be, well, prohibited. In fact, the groups said, DHS’s Chief Privacy Officer had violated the law when she failed to prohibit TSA’s new policy on whole body imaging. If the law had been followed, the groups said, “the new policy would not have been implemented in the first place.”  Such screening, they declared, “is exactly the type of action that the Chief Privacy Officer should be preventing in satisfaction of her statutory obligations.”  (Note: Rotenberg later told me that the New York Times misquoted him.)

For the privacy groups, it was just another day at the office.  The coalition that signed the letter was by now a well-oiled machine.  It had stalled many new security measures since 9/11.   And as far as whole body imaging was concerned, the privacy machine was on the brink of another success. 

In June, a bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives had voted to prohibit TSA from using the machines for primary screening.  With a three-to-one margin of victory, it was nearly inevitable that the restriction would have found its way into an appropriations bill or some other must-pass piece of legislation.  If not for the inconvenient timing of the Christmas attack, another new security technology would have been taken off the table. 

This wasn’t a victory just for the left-leaning groups that have traditionally scoffed at a war on terrorism. The privacy coalition that nearly killed imaging also included the American Association of Small Property Owners and the Gun Owners of America, and they persuaded large numbers of conservatives to vote against the security interests of air travelers.   The alliance reflects a kind of political circularity, in which the far left and the far right discover that they have more in common with each other than with the center. 

But in a deeply divided Congress, where each side counts on its most vociferous supporters to turn out the vote, one way to achieve bipartisan action is to propose legislation that appeals to the fringe of each party.  The ban on whole-body imaging was just such a proposal.  Republicans and Democrats alike could claim a victory for their base.  Republicans and Democrats alike were protected against partisan second-guessing in the event of an attack because the measure had support in both parties.  

It is a magic combination that has worked for the privacy coalition for years, despite the fact that most Americans are far more concerned about effective security than privacy.